ABSTRACT K-anonymisation is an approach to protecting privacy contained within a dataset. A good k-anonymisation algorithm should anonymise a dataset in such a way that private information contained within it is hidden, yet the anonymised data is still useful in intended applications. However, maximising both data utility and privacy protection in k-anonymisation is not possible. Existing methods derive k-anonymisations by trying to maximise utility while satisfying a required level of protection. In this paper, we propose a method that attempts to optimise the trade-off between utility and protection. We introduce a measure that captures both utility and protection, and an algorithm that exploits this measure using a combination of clustering and partitioning techniques. Our experiments show that the proposed method is capable of producing k-anonymisations with required utility and protection trade-off and with a performance scalable to large datasets.
INTRODUCTION
A vast amount of data about individuals is being collected and stored worldwide. Such data can contain private information about individuals, for example, their credit card numbers, shopping preferences and medical records. When the data is released for studies such as lifestyle surveys, business analysis and healthcare research, privacy protection becomes a serious concern. Unfortunately, simply removing unique identifiers (e.g. credit card numbers) from data is not enough, as individuals can still be identified using a combination of non-unique attributes such as age and postcode.
K-anonymisation has been proposed to address this concern [21] . Assume that a table T consists of two groups of attributes: quasi-identifiers (QIDs) that contain information that can potentially be used to identify individuals (e.g. age and postcode), and sensitive attributes (SAs) that contain sensitive information about individuals (e.g. their shopping
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preferences or diagnosed diseases). A k-anonymisation of
T is a view of T such that each tuple in the view is made identical (through some form of data generalisation) to at least k − 1 other tuples w.r.t. QIDs. For example, Table 1 is 3-anonymised w.r.t. Age and Postcode. Clearly, k-anonymisation helps prevent linking sensitive information to individuals but can affect data utility.
Id
Age Postcode Disease t 1 [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] For a given table, many k-anonymisations are possible. An ideal solution should maximise both data utility and privacy protection in anonymised data, but this is computationally not possible [18] . Various metrics have been proposed to capture what a good k-anonymisation should be and methods for deriving them heuristically [21, 15, 26] . A popular approach is to derive k-anonymisations that retain as much data utility as possible, while satisfying a minimum level of protection required [18, 16] . This is illustrated in Figure 1 . Here we have 3 possible k-anonymisations (a, b and c) of the same dataset. a will not be considered because it does not have the minimum level of protection required. Both b and c can be considered, but since b offers better data utility, existing methods attempt to produce b instead of c.
This approach is good for the data user as it seeks to maximise utility, but it may not represent the best interest of the data owner. Thus, alternative terms of utility/privacy trade-off need to be considered. Suppose, for example, that the data user is required to pay for a dataset based on its utility and is willing to pay an x amount for the dataset if an anonymisation has a required level of utility w.r.t. a certain measure, e.g. classification accuracy [13] . Knowing that the utility offered by anonymisation c is still sufficient for the user's requirement (see Figure 2) , the owner may want to produce c instead of b, as it offers better protection while still satisfying the user's utility requirement. Another example comes from location privacy preserving systems, where how location information is anonymised through data generalisation must satisfy both quality of service and identification protection requirements [10] . Since providing a certain level of protection may result in unacceptable quality of service in such applications, a desired trade-off between utility and privacy requirements is necessary. In fact, data users and owners have often conflicting requirements, thus detailed control of the level of utility and protection of anonymised data is necessary to help them reaching a compromise [9] . In this paper, we consider how kanonymisations with an optimal trade-off between data utility and protection may be produced, providing anonymisers with an intuitive mechanism to choose a different trade-off in case of different utility/protection requirements.
Our first contribution is a distance-based quality criterion that handles both QIDs and SAs on equal terms, a key requirement to trade-off utility and protection when kanonymising data. We show that our notion of distance on QIDs attempts to capture the accuracy of aggregate query answering, one of the main tasks anonymised data is used for [15, 25] and generalises many existing utility measures [17, 7] . We also explore the relation between adversarial background knowledge and the protection offered by kanonymisation, based on a more general definition of protection than that of [18, 16, 24, 25] . More specifically, we consider range disclosure, the case where sensitive information is estimated given ranges of values. For example, the second group in Table 1 includes {Bronchitis, F lu, P neumonia}, allowing an attacker to estimate that an individual suffers a respiratory problem (see Figure 3) . Such inferences are not prevented by existing protection mechanisms, posing a privacy danger in many real-world settings [23] . In response, we propose an intuitive and accurate probabilistic measure to capture protection under this threat model.
We also design an efficient heuristic algorithm for kanonymising data with a desired utility/privacy trade-off. Our algorithm optimises the weighted sum of the amount of generalisation of QIDs and the amount of protection of SAs, as they are captured using our measure. Furthermore, it uses a flexible multi-dimensional local recoding strategy and combines clustering with partitioning to achieve both quality and efficiency in the k-anonymisation process. Our analysis and experimental results show that our approach is able to produce k-anonymisations with required trade-off between utility and protection and with a performance scalable to large datasets.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss how data utility and privacy protection are captured. We present our method in Section 3 and experimentally evaluate it in Section 4. We briefly discuss the related work in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
MEASURING UTILITY AND PROTEC-TION
We first explain how data utility may be measured. Observe that data utility loss may occur when a table is kanonymised through data generalisation. For example, the following query can no longer be answered accurately using However, we can attempt to answer Q1 approximately using Table 1 . Assuming uniform distribution of data, we can calculate the probability of a tuple in Table 1 being in the answer to Q1 as p =
Rq∩R R
, where Rq and R denote the areas covered by Q1 and the qualifying tuples in Table 1 Table 1 satisfying the search condition of Q1, the estimated answer to Q1 is 3 × p. Intuitively, therefore, maximising the overlap between queries and their coverage by anonymised data is desirable.
More generally, we observe that k-anonymisation partitions a table into groups, and each group is represented by the minimum bounding rectangle (MBR) of an mdimensional hyper-rectangle [3] , where m is the number of QIDs, and each side (and its length) correspond to a QID (and the range of its generalised values) in the table. Since Rq is not known when the data is anonymised, it makes sense that we should minimise R, or the MBR of a group, in order to maximise p. Our utility measure is built on this observation. For an interval-based QID, ranges are naturally captured using the Euclidean distance. For a discrete attribute, however, there is no ordering among its values and distance between them is often defined in terms of their semantic relationships using a user-defined hierarchy [21] . For example, Figure 3 shows one such hierarchy for Disease. Given a hierarchy, distance between a group of discrete values can then be defined as the ratio of the number of leaves of the subtree rooted at the closest common ancestor of these values to the domain size [26] . If there is no hierarchy for a discrete attribute, we assume that the distance between any pair of values is equal. Q-diversity can handle all different types of QIDs uniformly, being more general than the Maxsize [7] and Usefulness [17] utility measures, which cannot handle ordered discrete attributes. Based on Q-diversity, we define data utility to be the average Q-diversity across groups over all QIDs, assuming attribute independence. Intuitively, utility reflects the average amount of generalisation that each group of tuples incurs, and a small score is preferred.
Definition 2.2 (Utility).
Assume that a table T comprised of m QIDs {a1, . . . , am} is clustered into groups {g1, g2, . . . , gh}, such that |gj| ≥ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ h, and tuples of gj will have the same values in each QID after anonymisation. The utility of T under this clustering is defined as
where qd(πa i (gj)) denotes the Q-diversity of group gj w.r.t. ai, 1 ≤ j ≤ h and 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
To explain how privacy protection is captured, we need to consider how sensitive information about individuals may be learned from a k-anonymised table. For our analysis, we assume that information about an individual I is modelled as a single tuple tI in the anonymised dataset (the reader is referred to [25] for models considering multiple tuples), the attacker has identified the group (called covering group) that contains tI , and he attempts to determine the SA value sI for I. We note that in practice it is often sufficient for the attacker to obtain the SA value within a range, e.g. salary in $40-42K or a disease being "virus", in order for the privacy to be considered breached. We therefore allow ranges to be used to model attackers' estimation power in our measure of protection.
Some existing frequency-based protection measures, such as l-diversity [18] , (a, k)-anonymity [24] and p-sensitive kanonymity [22] , consider attackers with zero estimation power. Thus, they do not prevent range disclosure, since groups with a very small range can be formed, even though salary values are distinct. T -closeness [16] requires grouping SA values with a distribution similar to that of the SA value in the whole dataset, effectively assuming attackers with maximum estimation power when these two distributions are identical. However, SA values can still be accurately estimated, when the original distribution allows such inferences for example.
We assume that the attacker attempts to determine sI within a specified range having width r and model the protection for I's sensitive information as the probability of a range r covering sI being disclosed. Observe that a tuple tj in the covering group for tI (including tI itself) contributes to attacker's estimate only when the distance between tj and tI 's SA values is less than or equal to r. For example, when r includes "respiratory problem", all pairs containing values "Flu", "Bronchitis" and "Pneumonia" can be estimated. We capture this as pairwise contribution (pc). Intuitively, a larger pc score implies a smaller distance between tj and tI 's SA values, and tj contributes more to the disclosing of sI .
Definition 2.3 (Pairwise Contribution).
Assume that a is an SA, the domain of a is Da, and vi, vj are a pair of values obtained from a. The pairwise-contribution for vi, vj is defined as:
, s({vi, vj}) and |Da| have same definitions as those in Definition 2.1.
Assuming that each sensitive value can be estimated equally likely for any individual in a group [25] , we measure the protection of sensitive information for the group as the ratio of total contribution the attacker obtains from the SA values in the group for all individuals, to the maximum contribution that the attacker could possibly have from the group. We call this measure S-diversity.
Definition 2.4 (S-diversity).
Assume that a is an SA, the domain of a is Da, and Va ⊆ Da is a subset of values obtained from a. The S-diversity of Va for a given range r, denoted by sd(Va, r), is defined as:
where pc(vi, vj) is given in Definition 2.3 and r is normalised to [0, 1].
S-diversity has two important properties. First, it can be applied to SA values in any metric space. Consider for example, g1 = {t1, t2, t3} and g2 = {t4, t5, t6} in Table 1 and their corresponding sensitive values in Disease. Both groups are considered to be equally protected by some existing measures, such as l-diversity, which handle only unordered discrete SAs. However, if we consider the distance between these values according to the hierarchy shown in Figure 3 and assume r = 0.5, then the probabilities of disclosing any SA value in g1 and g2, measured by S-diversity, )) 3 2 = 0.733 respectively. 1 The pairs (t1, t1), (t2, t2), (t3, t3) have pc ≥ 0.5 and thus can be estimated. Specifically, these pairs have pc = 1, hence the S-diversity is This suggests that g2 offers less protection than g1 does, and is justified as the SA values in g2 are not as diverse as those in g1, i.e. they are all respiratory problems (see Figure 3) . Second, attacker's estimation power can be controlled by varying r, as opposed to t-closeness which effectively sets r to 1 for all cases. Consider g3 = {t7, t8, t9} in Table 1 , for example. g3 is considered to offer more protection when r = 0.5 than when r = 0.7 using the S-diversity measure. Again, this is justified because when r = 0.5 (a narrower estimate range is used), the value "HIV" of t9 is not considered to help the SA values of t7 and t8 to be inferred. In contrast, t-closeness assumes that all SA values can help an attacker's estimation and thus considers g3 as equally protected in both cases.
Based on this measure, the protection for a table is defined as the average S-diversity of all its groups over SAs. A small score means that the values in SAs are far apart from one another and thus are better protected.
Definition 2.5 (Protection).
Assume that a table T comprised of s SAs {a1, . . . , as} is clustered into groups {g1, g2, . . . , gh}, such that |gj| ≥ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ h, and tuples of gj will have the same values in each QID after anonymisation. The protection of T under this clustering is defined as
where sd(πa i (gj), r) denotes the S-diversity of group gj w.r.t.
Finally, the discussion so far assumed a single covering group for an individual, but overlapping groups can be created in k-anonymisation, as a result of using multidimensional recoding [15] . In this case, individuals may achieve more (but not less) protection than that measured by S-diversity. Also, we note that weights may be used to reflect the significance of each attribute. Due to space restrictions, we do not discuss these further in this paper.
GROUPING DATA
In this section, we present our method that combines clustering with partitioning. That is, we first partition data into suitable sub-spaces, and then cluster data in each sub-space separately. We explain how both quality and efficiency may be achieved in generating k-anonymisations with utility and protection trade-off.
Threshold-Based Greedy Clustering
Clustering algorithms use heuristics and perform greedy search in grouping data. The existing clustering heuristics and search strategies attempt to optimise data utility [26, 5] , and therefore are not useful for our purpose. To derive kanonymisations with "optimal" trade-off between data utility and protection, we propose the following heuristic.
Definition 3.1 (Weighted Tuple diversity).
Let τ ⊆ T be a set of tuples over a set of attributes A = {a1, a2, . . . , ap}. Without loss of generality, we assume that the first m attributes are QIDs and the rest are SAs. The weighted tuple diversity of τ w.r.t. A, denoted by wtd(τ, A), is defined as:
where πa i (τ ) denotes the projection of τ on attribute ai, wu, wp ∈ [0, 1] are the weights, and we require wu + wp = 1.
The idea of optimising the weighted sum of an information-loss and a protection measure is not new. It has been successfully applied in [17] . However, our formulation has two interesting properties. First, we achieve a much stronger notion of protection. This is because, as opposed to [17] , S-diversity can effectively prevent range disclosure. Second, attributes of any type are treated uniformly, therefore datasets with mixed attributes can be handled. However, deriving optimal k-anonymisations using our heuristic, as specified in Definition 3.2, is NP-hard (proof follows [1] ).
Definition 3.2 (Optimal clustering).
Let T be a table consisting of n tuples and p attributes A = {a1, a2, . . . , ap}. Given a set of user specified weights wu, wp and a range r as defined in Definitions 3.1 and 2.4 respectively, an optimal clustering of T is a partition P = {c1, . . . , ch} of T such that |cj| ≥ k, j = 1, . . . , h,
S h j=1 cj = T , and its average weighted tuple diversity avg wtd(T, A) =
is minimal.
Thus, we introduce a heuristic threshold-based greedy clustering algorithm (shown in Algorithm 1) which works as follows. It randomly picks up a tuple ti as the seed of a cluster and removes it from T in step 2. In steps 3-7 it repeatedly finds the closest tuples to this cluster, one at time, and adds them into the cluster until a threshold is reached. We find a tuple tj that is closest to the cluster in step 4 by computing wtd({c ∪ {tj}}, A) according to Definition 3.1. If adding tj into the cluster will not cause a threshold (δ), which controls the maximally-allowed weighted tuple diversity in a group, to be exceeded (step 6), then tj will be added into the cluster and removed from T (step 7). If δ is exceeded, then the size of the created cluster is checked in step 8. If it is greater than k, tuples in the cluster are anonymised using a local recoding function, else this cluster is rejected. The process is repeated until all tuples of T are processed. We treat rejected clusters as bad local minima (the reason will be given in Section 3.2). Thus, we un-cluster tuples that belong in rejected clusters after clustering, and put each one into the cluster that will result in a minimal increment in weighted tuple-diversity when the tuple is inserted.
Algorithm 1 Threshold-Based Greedy Clustering
while true do 4.
find tj ∈ T s.t. wtd({c ∪ {tj}}, A) is minimum; 5.
c ← c ∪ {tj}; 6.
if (wtd(c , A) > δ) exit; 7.
c ← c ; T ← T − {tj}; 8.
if (|c| ≥ k) k-anonymise(c) else reject c;
The proposed algorithm differs from existing clusteringbased methods [5, 26, 6] in two main ways. First, it forms clusters based on both data utility and protection, thus it does not simply try to optimise utility. Second, it uses a quality-based instead of a size-based stopping criterion. Since the quality of anonymisations is not solely determined by the size of clusters, measuring maximally-allowed information diversity within a group is better and more meaningful. On performance, Threshold-Based Greedy Clustering has a time complexity that is similar to existing clusteringbased methods, and is quadratic to the cardinality of the dataset.
Median-Based Pre-Partitioning
Attempts to improving clustering performance in general have been reported in the literature. The main idea behind these methods is to reduce the amount of computation required by pairwise distance comparisons by restricting search spaces using sampling [11] , top-down bisection [26] or a cheap pre-clustering step [19] . All these methods are not efficient when a large number of small clusters are to be created, which is the case in k-anonymisation, and their similarity measures do not capture utility and protection, thereby affecting the quality of k-anonymisations that clustering can achieve. Thus, these solutions are not directly useful for k-anonymisation.
We propose a pre-partitioning step that is geared toward improving the performance of our threshold-based clustering without significantly affecting the quality of the anonymisations it produces. It follows a kd-tree type of partitioning [8] , which partitions data recursively into subspaces along the median of QID with the largest normalised domain. Algorithm 2 shows our method. Given a set of tuples τ (initially the entire table T ), a size constraint s and a protection constraint δ , the algorithm recursively derives a partition of τ as follows. First, it finds the QID attribute of τ that has the largest domain size and computes its median (step 2). Then, the data is partitioned around the median 2 (steps 3-5) until τ cannot be further divided without violating constraints on the minimum partition size k and maximum S-diversity δ (steps 6-7).
Algorithm 2 Median-Based Pre-Partitioning
find attribute aj ∈ QID s.t. values in aj have the largest range; 3.
splitV al ← f ind median(πa j (τ )); 4.
p ← {t ∈ τ : πa j (t) ≤ splitV al}; 5.
p ← {t ∈ τ : πa j (t) > splitV al}; 6.
if (|p| ≥ s and |p | ≥ s and
Pre-partition(p, s, δ ) S Pre-partition(p , s, δ ); 8.
else return τ ;
A good partitioning strategy for improving the performance of clustering in k-anonymisation should satisfy three criteria. First, it should allow the follow-up clustering to be performed significantly more efficiently. This implies that each subspace should contain a small number of tuples. Second, it itself must be efficient, so that the cost of partitioning does not offset the savings gained by clustering in smaller subspaces. Third, the quality of clustering should not be af-fected too much. We now discuss our partitioning strategy in terms of these criteria.
Theorem 3.1 below shows that a significant speed up can be achieved if the subspaces created by pre-partitioning are relatively small, particularly when they are equal-sized. We note that our median-based partitioning strategy creates nearly equal-sized subspaces, as a result of splitting data around the median, thus is good for complexity reduction. Furthermore, it can be done efficiently [8] , requiring only O(nlog(n)) time to execute. Theorem 3.1. Pre-partitioning of a dataset T reduces the complexity of the threshold-based clustering algorithm to O(s × n), where n is the size of the dataset and s the minimum size of the resultant subspaces.
Proof. (Sketch) Let P = {p1, ..., pm} be a partition of T created by applying Algorithm 2. The worst-case time complexity of the clustering-based algorithm when applied to each pi separately is O( P m i=1 |pi| 2 ), which is minimised to O(m × |pi| 2 ), when all pi are equal-sized for a fixed m. Since we have P m i=1 |pi| = m|pi| = n, the complexity of the clustering-based algorithm with pre-partitioning be-
We now consider the quality issues. First, we study the effect of pre-partitioning on data utility. Obviously, by partitioning data into subspaces, we restrict the number of tuples to be scanned while forming a cluster. Assume that s is a subspace and a cluster c is to be formed using t ∈ s as a seed (see Algorithm 1). We observe that the quality of c should not be affected if the nearest neighbours of t are also in s. This problem has been studied extensively in the context of multi-dimensional indexes [4] . To illustrate this, we give the following analysis.
Suppose that a dataset is cut along a QID q and two subspaces sl, sr are created as a result. It is possible that sl and sr will contain the same value in q (as we split at the median). In such cases, we say that the two subspaces overlap, and when this happens, a cluster may be better formed by considering tuples of both subspaces. Furthermore, as splits are based on only one QID at a time, subspaces may overlap in the remaining QIDs as well. Consider applying pre-partitioning to the data shown in Table 2 with s = 2, for example. Since Age has a much larger domain than those of Height and Postcode, all splits are done around Age when Algorithm 2 is used. This created the anonymisation shown in Table 3 , which clearly incurred more information loss if we compare it to that shown in Table 4 which is derived by using clustering alone. This is because, as illustrated in Figure 4 , good groups depicted as small rectangles in the 3D space of {Age,Height,Postcode}, intersect the subspaces {S 1 , . . . , S 4 } and thus are "broken" by pre-partitioning. Consequently, this results in less utility compared to what can be achieved when clustering without pre-partitioning is applied.
So, if a clustering algorithm does not look beyond a single subspace when deriving clusters, a large number of overlapping subspaces may result in poor clusters. We observe however that the effect of overlap is significantly reduced if we use a sufficiently larger s than k. Our partitioning step ensures that this is the case by using a suitable subspace size threshold s. Unclustering tuples of rejected clusters also helps, as they can be grouped together with their Age Height Postcode Sal.  10  170  NW30  20  15  175  NW32  20  15  170  NW30  65  20  175  NW32  65  20  170  NW30  20  25  175  NW32  20  25  170  NW30  65  30 175 NW32 65 Table 2 Age Height Postcode Sal. [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 170 NW30 20 [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 170 NW30 65 [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] 175 NW32 20 [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] 175 NW32 65 [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] 170 NW30 20 [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] 170 NW30 65 [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] 175 NW32 20 [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] 175 NW32 65 Table 4 : Clustering Table 2 Figure 4: Intersection between clusters and subspaces when s = k closest neighbours that may lie in a different subspace. Furthermore, we note that the size and shape of clusters can also affect the quality of anonymisations, as small (i.e. having an MBR whose perimeter is smaller than that of the MBR of their corresponding subspace) and similar-shaped clusters are less likely to intersect a subspace created by median-based partitioning [20] . Our clustering step specifically minimises the perimeter of the MBR and uses δ to create clusters of similar shape. We now examine the impact of pre-partitioning on protection. It is easy to see that using a size constraint and splitting on the median as in [15] , can create subspaces with an arbitrarily low level of protection, even when subspaces are large. For example, the subspaces shown in Table 3 have all the same value in Salary and thus offer no protection. We have therefore introduced a protection constraint in Algorithm 2, avoiding to further split a subspace when the sum of S-diversity over all SAs exceeds δ in either of the resultant subspaces. This makes our partitioning aware of the trade-off between utility and protection and helps subsequent clustering.
As our pre-partitioning strategy remedies the problem of overlapping and unprotected subspaces, pre-partitioning serves well the purpose of maintaining quality of anonymisations produced by our clustering step. Our experimental results show that using an s just 5 times larger than k suffices to maintain the quality of clustering, while improving the performance of anonymisations by many orders of magnitude.
Thresholds selection
In this section, we discuss how the thresholds used in our algorithm can be set. In order to determine the thresholds δ and δ , we have developed a simple and efficient heuristic, which is based on the following observation. Groups derived by applying clustering on the whole dataset have similar quality to those derived by applying clustering on a sample of this dataset taken using random sampling with replacement, when the same δ is used. This is because groups are typically of similar size and thus are not likely to be missed by sampling. Moreover, even though some groups are missed, quality is not significantly affected, as δ still allows a good grouping for most clusters. Figure 5 depicts the utility and protection measures of applying clustering setting k = 5, wu = wp, r = 1 and varying δ on the Adults dataset [12] and on a 2.5% sample of it. Observe that both utility and protection measures are well reflected in the sample of data. Based on these observations, we propose the heuristic given in Algorithm 3.3.
Algorithm 3
Sampling-based selection heuristic for δ.
1. S ← sample(T ); i ← 1; 2. while i < max iterations do 3.
split [0, 1] into 2 i equal-length intervals; 4.
choose the mean of each interval as δr; 5.
for each δr do 6.
apply Algorithm 1 to S 7. choose δr s.t. the sum of utility and protection for S is minimum
The basic idea is that we run our clustering algorithm on a small random sample of the dataset several times, each time by changing the value of δ, so as to investigate the difference in clusters quality (as it is evaluated by the sum of utility and protection scores). Then, we choose the δ which results in the best clustering. Furthermore, δ is set to the level of protection corresponding to the best clustering found before. This is because the mean and standard deviation of pairwise distances between SA values do not significantly vary across different subspaces when pre-partitioning is used with an s larger than k, as verified by our experiments. We note that a sample less than 2.5% and 4-6 iterations were enough to find fairly good values for thresholds δ and δ for various levels of k very efficiently. We have also experimentally found that using s = 5 × k is a fairly good choice for s as mentioned in Section 3.2.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we report experimental results. We configured three versions of our algorithm: TGCU (Thresholdbased Greedy Clustering Utility with wu = 1 and wp = 0) for optimal utility, TGCP (Threshold-based Greedy Clustering Protection with wu = 0 and wp = 1) for optimal protection, and TGCB (Threshold-based Greedy Clustering Balance with wu = 0.5 and wp = 0.5) for a balanced utility and protection. We compare them to three benchmark algorithms: Mondrian [15] is partition-based and is very efficient; K-Members [5] is clustering-based and can achieve very good data utility; and K-Members-p is a modified version of K-members where we changed its objective function to optimise protection instead of utility, so it can achieve very good protection. Both Mondrian and K-members have been shown to achieve better utility than the global recoding algorithm used by [18, 16, 24] , so this algorithm was excluded from our experiments. Our objective is to investigate how the quality of solutions with a trade-off between utility and protection compares to those produced by methods that specifically optimise one of these properties. We also test the impact of parameters used by our method on data quality and examine its efficiency.
Quality of Anonymisation
For these experiments, we used the Adults dataset [12] which has become a benchmark for k-anonymisation. The dataset is comprised of 8 attributes and 30162 tuples. We configured the dataset as in [13] , but left out Education and treated Marital status and Occupation as SAs. Occupation was transformed to an interval SA, in the same way as described in [26] . We configured the parameters of our algorithms as follows: subspace size threshold s = 5 × k, thresholds δ and δ were set by the method discussed in Section 3.3, and estimation range r = 1.
For data utility, we compare our method to others in terms of our utility measure (UM), discernability measure (DM) [2] and average relative error (A.R.E.) (the average relative difference between the actual and estimated query result for all queries, when applied to the generalised dataset) [15] . As can be seen in Figure 6 , TGCB substantially outperformed Mondrian in terms of UM, achieving a result that is very close to that of K-Members and TGCU. TGCP and K-Members-p performed poorly, as expected, as they do not optimise data utility. Furthermore, all versions of our algorithm achieved a low DM value as shown in Figure 7 , even though we do not restrict the size of a group like Mondrian and K-Members do.
For the A.R.E. test, we examined two types of COUNT-query.
A type-1 query retrieves the number of tuples satisfying randomly chosen range predicates on {Age, Gender, Income} , while a type-2 query additionally uses predicates involving {Race, W orkClass}. The selectivity was 1.5% and 0.5% for type-1 and type-2 queries respectively. We used a workload of 10000 queries for each query type. Estimated results were derived by computing the probability p for each tuple, as explained in Section 2, and summing up the probabilities for all tuples. Figure 8 reports the normalised error in A.R.E. for Mondrian, K-Members and the three configurations of our algorithm, for various k levels. That is, the normalised difference in A.R.E., , where x is the A.R.E. of a method, and a, b are the A.R.E. achieved by the best and worst A.R.E. val- ues for a specific k. K-Members-p performed very poorly in this test since it does not optimise utility, and thus was not included in the computation of the normalised error values. K-Members achieved small A.R.E. values for type-1 queries when k was small, whereas Mondrian did well when k is large. Interestingly, TGCU outperformed both Mondrian and K-Members for all values of k. This is largely attributed to the fact that both Mondrian and K-Members use sizebased stopping criteria when forming groups. As a result some "distant" tuples were brought into a group to satisfy size requirement, thereby increasing information loss. It is worth noting that TGCB performed particularly well, being comparable to that of TGCU. Furthermore, TGCP performed well only when k was small, as achieving protection comes at an increased cost of utility when k is large. Then, we examined type-2 queries, which are more difficult to be accurately answered than type-1 queries due to the higher dimensionality and lower selectivity. As illustrated in Figure 9 , all configurations of our algorithm outperformed both Mondrian and K-members for type-2 queries. This validates that using clustering with a quality-based stopping criterion can preserve correlations between QIDs better, achieving more utility.
For the same runs, we also evaluated protection using our protection measure. Comparing Figures 6 and 10 , it is easy to see that optimising data utility adversely affected protection. To compare our method with benchmark algorithms using the (c,l)-diversity measure [18] for protection, we used a sample created by taking the first 5000 tuples of the Adults dataset and treated Occupation as the single, discrete SA. Here, l is the number of distinct SA values in a group and c is the fraction of the occurrences of the most frequent SA value in the group and the sum of the occurrences of remaining l−1 SA values. Figures 11 and 12 illustrate the results. While Mondrian, K-Members and TGCU created diverse groups, similar SA values were put together and thus protection was low. In contrast, TGCB, TGCP and K-Members-p created groups with few but semantically distant SA values, none of which appeared too frequently.
In summary, it is evident that the combined use of clustering and partitioning is beneficial: TGCU outperforms both Mondrian and K-Members in query answering, while TGCP achieves comparable protection to that of K-Members-p. Interestingly, TGCB demonstrated a performance that is very close to that of TGCU and TGCB, confirming the opportunity for utility and protection trade-off.
Effect of Data Skewness
It is known that partitioning may affect data utility when data is skewed, as it creates overlapping subspaces [4] . We tested our algorithm on a number of skewed distributions and found that skewness had little effect on data utility. Restricted by space, we only report the result using a synthetic dataset (comprised of 8000 tuples and 5 attributes) with standard normal distribution. The parameters of our method were set as in Section 4.1 and we evaluated the result using UM. As illustrated in Figure 13 , TGCU achieved a result very close to that of K-Members and the performance of TGCB was comparable to that too.
Furthermore, it is more likely that a large number of semantically close SA values are grouped together when data is skewed. Thus, Mondrian, K-Members and TGCU achieved very low protection, as shown in Figure 14 . In contrast, TGCB was able to trade-off some utility for better protection and thus its result is comparable to K-Members-p and TGCP. We should note, however, that much utility has to be traded-off to achieve strong protection in presence of very high skewness, and alternative techniques based on SA generalisation [25] might be helpful. 
Effect of Parameters
We first considered the effect of the subspace size threshold s used in pre-partitioning. In this experiment, we varied s from 5 to the size of dataset and used TGCB with k = 5. As illustrated in Figure 15 , the quality of anonymisations improves as s increases, only until the size of subspace reached a certain threshold (s = 5k), and remained stable after this point. This is because the effect of overlapping subspaces is not significant when s becomes much larger than k. Thus, a small s can be used in our method to generate high quality anonymisations efficiently. We then repeated the same experiment on the synthetic dataset used in Section 4.2. Quality again stopped to improve after s = 5k, as shown in Figure 16 . We in fact have observed similar behaviour for different values of k and using other quality metrics, but restricted by space we do not report these results here.
We also studied how the range r used in S-diversity (see Definition 2.4) affects quality. We used TGCB on the synthetic dataset with the same parameters as in the previous experiment, treating the SA as interval-based and varying r. As shown in Figure 17 , a larger r helped TGCB to trade-off protection for utility. This confirms the benefit of controlling the expected attacker's estimation power offered by our protection measure. Finally, we tested the impact of weights wu, wp in quality on the synthetic dataset. All parameters were set as in the previous experiment, except k which was set to 10. Figure  18 illustrates the result. As can be seen, weights are able to lead the algorithm finding a desired trade-off. 
Efficiency of Computation
The efficiency of our algorithm was studied and compared to the other two methods. For this experiment, we fixed k = 5 and ran the algorithms on samples of the Adults dataset with size ranging from 500 to 10000. The results are shown in Figure 19 . We observe that K-Members and TGCB without pre-partitioning were slow due to their quadratic time complexity. In contrast, Mondrian is the fastest for its log-linear time complexity. However, the runtime of TGCB (with the pre-partitioning step) is very close to that of Mondrian, when the subspace size s is 5k, as in our experiments. According to Theorem 3.1, the use of pre-partitioning reduces the time complexity of clustering to O(s × n), and thus the overall time complexity of our method becomes O(n × log(n) + n × s) ≈ O(k × n), when log(n) < s and s ≈ k. As typically k is a small constant, our algorithm scales very well to large datasets. In order to further test this behaviour, we fixed k = 5 and n = 10000 and varied s from 2k to the size of the dataset. As can be seen in Figure 20 , the runtime of our algorithm is not practically affected by s when s < 100k , achieving a log-linear perfomance to n. 
RELATED WORK
Various measures for determining the quality of a kanonymisation exist. For data utility, they typically quantify information loss resulted from data generalisation [7, 21, 13, 26] , or accuracy degradation when performing certain tasks, e.g. query answering [15] or building classifiers [2] , using anonymised data. Our utility measure captures information loss and is similar in principle to [17, 7] , but it is more general in that it can be applied to any type of attribute. For protection, Machanavajjhala et al. [18] proposed l-diversity, a frequency-based measure treating SAs having unordered discrete values. Frequency-based measures have also been proposed by Truta et al. [22] and Wong et al. [24] . Li et al. [16] proposed t-closeness, a measure based on data distribution in SAs. All such measures assume that attackers have either zero or maximum estimation power and they are applicable only to single SAs. As a result, none of them is able to protect SA values from being estimated. Our protection measure protects ranges from being disclosed, allowing varying estimation power to be modelled and is applicable to multiple SAs.
K-anonymising data can be achieved through a number of techniques including micro-aggregation [6] and generalisation [21] . Generalisation-based algorithms can be classified into two groups. Some follow the global recoding model, mapping the domain of QIDs into generalised values [14] . As far as achieving trade-off between utility and protection is concerned, these algorithms are rather limited in that they only search QIDs for data groupings with optimal utility and protection requirement is only checked as a constraint that the resultant k-anonymisation must satisfy. The second category of algorithms uses local recoding, which maps the values of individual tuples into generalised ones on a group by group basis. Most existing algorithms search the QID space for data utility optimisation only, while in our previous work [17] we consider balancing utility with a basic protection requirement. All of these algorithms suffer from poor scalability [26, 5, 17] . Our method also uses local recoding, but is driven by a heuristic that attempts to optimise the trade-off between utility and protection from range disclosure and is done very efficiently as a result combining clustering with partitioning.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Existing methods do not fully consider how data utility and protection may be traded-off while k-anonymising data. This paper addresses this issue by developing a method which optimises the trade-off between these two requirements in a controlled way. We introduce a distance-based measure that captures both utility and protection and can handle attributes of any type uniformly. We also develop an efficient algorithm based on clustering with partitioning. Our extensive experiments verify that our method produces anonymisations with a good trade-off between data utility and protection, and often outperforms methods which specifically optimise one of these two requirements.
There are some interesting directions for future research. First, it would be worthwhile to study how utility and protection can be traded-off when anonymised data is intended for specific data mining applications. Second, releasing the dominating set of anonymised tables with optimal trade-off is worth exploring. We plan to address these issues in the near future.
